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The Care Standards Act 2000 is a wide ranging statute.
It establishes a new independent regulatory body for social
care and private and voluntary health care in England, the
National Care Standards Commission. In Wales, these
services are now under the control of the National
Assembly for Wales. An independent Council has also been
established to register social workers and to set standards
in social work. An independent Children’s Commissioner
has been established in Wales, and it may well be that a
similar scheme will be introduced in time in England as
well. Childminders and day care providers are now also
regulated. There is an expanded statutory list of those
unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults. Appeals in these
areas are brought before the Care Standards Tribunal.
It is likely, in the light of ongoing reforms of the
administrative justice system in England and Wales, that
the specialist education and health Tribunals will draw
closer together. These early decisions will provide a
framework for the developments in the future, maintaining
the central policy that the safety and welfare of our
children must be protected, whilst at the same time
ensuring that an individual’s human rights are not ignored
whenever decisions are taken to prohibit people from
working with children and young people. The early history
of the Care Standards Tribunal makes clear that decisions
of Government Ministers are not simply “rubber
stamped”. Although the decisions of the Tribunal are of
course individual decisions on particular facts, the
indications are that it has begun to lay down guidance that
will help in the formulation of standards in this sensitive
area of social policy.
All Care Standards Tribunal decisions are available on
the Tribunal website, www.carestandardstribunal.gov.uk
David Pearl
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My focus is principally, although not exclusively, onthe constitutions of states which are in theprocess of transformation, as the constitutional
courts in these countries appear more open to newer
approaches and ideas. This is an openness from which we
in the more established democracies may have much to learn.
REASONS FOR DEVELOPING A
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE OF
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
The cultural identity of a compassionate, democratic
society is in part assessed by how accessible lawyers and
Constitutions are to the most vulnerable in our community.
Because of the limited direct access to international human
rights fora, constitutional rights of children are particularly
important because a supreme or constitutional court may
offer the highest form of remedy. The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, unlike the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, still does not have a mechanism through which
children may have their complaints against a state
adjudicated. An attempt was made during the drafting of
the Convention by Amnesty International but this did not
The constitutional rights
of children
by Geraldine Van Bueren
The significant difference between modernity and past eras is that
modernity emphasises choice and autonomy and the past relied upon fate.
This is an enquiry both into the effectiveness of constitutions in seeking to
protect the autonomous rights of children and whether a global culture of
children’s constitutional rights is beginning to develop. Children’s civil and
political constitutional rights are analysed as well as their economic, social
and cultural constitutional rights, as it is the poorest children, who many
unthinkingly dismiss as being beyond the scope of justiciability and the courts.
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even have the support of all the non-governmental
organizations. The general regional human rights treaties,
including the European Convention on Human Rights,
were never intended to be, nor have they become, child
centred treaties. There is only one regional general
children’s rights treaty, the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child l990; the European Convention
on the Exercise of Children’s Rights l995 is a much poorer
cousin. Hence, without an international right of petition,
constitutional remedies remain for many children their last
hope of dignity.
Children’s constitutional rights are often regarded as
marginal but in many states those under the age of 18
constitute the majority of the population.
THE “4 PS”
Prevention and provision
In South Africa the constitutional rights of children
remained in the television and newspaper headlines week
after week, and in one area of children’s constitutional
rights, the child’s right to life and access to health services,
may even have contributed to the downslide of the South
African rand trading in international markets. A non-
governmental organisation, the Treatment Action
Campaign, together with another non governmental
Organisation and a doctor, challenged the South African
government over its refusal to provide all HIV positive
mothers with the drug nevirapine, which was designed to
prevent mother to child transmission of HIV/AIDS. The
background to the case, although not an issue directly
raised in the Constitutional Court, was that senior
members of the South African government, including
President Mbeki, appeared to be uncertain as to whether
there was a link between HIV and AIDS. The government’s
policy was to make nevirapine only available at 18 pilot
sites reaching 10 per cent of the population (this number
was later increased but not significantly). Nevirapine
however had been licensed in l998 by the ANC
government and in 2001 by the World Health Organisation
for the prevention of mother to child HIV transmission. In
effect the government’s policy made a child’s survival
dependent on the lottery of geography.
Prevention is vital. It is estimated that over 4.5 million
people, or 10% of the population of South Africa, is HIV
positive. The agonising reality is that 24% of pregnant
women in South Africa are HIV positive and 70,000
children are infected each year through mother to child
transmission of HIV. Mother to child transmission in South
Africa is one of the most common forms of infection.
Nevirapine does not save the life of the mother, but it does
reduce significantly the chance of a baby who is not
breastfed of becoming HIV positive.
The issue, however, is not simply one of medication.
There needs to be counseling both before and after birth,
because aside from the momentous impact of learning of
HIV or AIDS, the manufacturers of Nevirpine have warned
against breast feeding. This means that breast milk
substitutes and clean drinking water need to be made
accessible, and this has immense resource implications for
South Africa.
HIV/ Aids can be treated with anti-retroviral drugs such
as AZT and Nevirapine, but Nevirapine differs from most
inhibitors in being cheap and simple to administer. All that
is required is for the mother to take a single pill before
birth and for the baby to be given a few drops within the
first 72 hours. The government argued that it would be a
breach of the separation of powers for the courts to order
the executive to prescribe a specific drug.
The Constitutional Court saw the issue in a different
light (see further Minister of Health and Others v Treatment
Action Campaign and Others CCT8/02, Judgment of 5 July
2002). In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Chaskalson the Court ruled that it had the jurisdiction to
answer two questions. Firstly, did the measures adopted by
the government to provide access to health care services
for HIV-positive mothers and their newborn babies meet
its obligations under the Constitution? Article 27 (1) of the
South African constitution guarantees the right of everyone
to have access to health care services, including
reproductive health care. Secondly, as section 27(2) of the
Constitution obliges the state to take reasonable legislative
and other measures within available resources to realise the
right to health, had the government adopted a
comprehensive policy for the prevention of mother to child
transmission of HIV. The answer to both questions was in
the negative.
The Constitutional Court conceded that courts are ill-
suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could
have multiple social and economic consequences for the
community. However, although the South African
Constitution protects economic and social rights, the
Constitution contemplates a restrained and focused role
for the courts, namely to require the state to take measures
to meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the
reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Although
this judicial process may have budgetary implications,
judgments are not in themselves directed at rearranging
budgets. In this way, the judicial, legislative and executive
functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.
The Court argued that there were no bright lines
separating the roles of the legislature, executive and courts
but that did not mean that courts cannot make orders which
impact on policy. The Constitutional Court ordered the
government to make Nevirapine available free of charge at
all public health facilities. The Government was also ordered
to make provision, if necessary, for counsellors to be based
at all public hospitals and clinics and trained for the necessary
counselling for the use of Nevirapine. At the Barcelona
AIDS Conference the government announced that it would
abide by the decision of the Constitutional Court.28
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Even before the Constitutional Court’s judgment, the
case succeeded in raising the profile of children’s
constitutional rights. Constitutional challenges are being
prepared on the quality of children’s education –
particularly amongst the rural poor – the costs of
education, and cases on the child’s right to social security.
Another case, which is being researched, is arguing that
specific arms sales are contrary to the constitution because
inter alia they prevent the government honouring its
constitutional obligations to health and children’s
education. There is some legal support for such an
approach, as the United Nations Committee on the Rights
of the Child, which South Africa as a party to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child has to report to, has
criticised Egypt and Indonesia on the proportion of their
budget spent on defence, as compared to the proportion
spent on children’s social expenditure (see further Van
Bueren, “Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional
Court” , 15 South African Journal of Human Rights 1999, 52).
South Africa has incorporated a very progressive
approach in relation to international human rights law.
Under section 39 of the Bill of Rights, judges considering
any provision of the Bill of Rights are under a legal duty to
consider international law (the wording of the section
provides that courts ‘must consider international law’). It
is the proportions which are of concern to the United
Nations Committee not the totals spent. An approach,
which focuses on proportions, totally undermines the
frequently heard government argument of non-affordability.
The development of a broader test case strategy to
protect children’s constitutional rights is positive.
Children’s rights, like women’s and the rights of those with
disabilities, are inherently inclusive. There is an
improvement in the lives of other sections of the
community, as it is neither desirable nor possible, to
protect children’s rights in isolation from their families and
communities. However, the South African Constitutional
Court appears to have adopted a different perspective. It is
genuinely concerned over the implications of a
constitution which grants children specific rights, because
the Constitutional Court argues, there is a risk that
children’s rights may trump adult rights.
In the earlier and landmark case of Grootboom
(Government of the Republic of South Africa et al v Irene
Grootboom and others, Judgment of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa, 4 October 2000), Mrs Irene Grootboom
and 899 respondents were homeless because they were
evicted from metal self-built shacks, which had been
erected on private land earmarked for formal low-cost
housing. Many had applied for subsidised low-cost housing
from the municipality, but had been on the waiting list for
as long as seven years. The respondents were mainly but
not exclusively, women and children.
The South African constitution enshrines a specific
section, section 28, on the rights of the child. This provides
that the best interests of the child are of paramount
importance – a standard which is higher than the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which only provides
that the best interests shall be ‘a primary consideration.’
Significantly, in contrast to other sections of the
Constitution on economic and social rights, the rights of
the child section, does not incorporate a limitations clause.
In the High Court Judge Davis had ruled that the
government, local, provincial and national had been in
breach of the child’s right to basic shelter and ordered the
government to make the necessary resources and materials
available to provide for basic shelter and for access to clean
drinking water. The best interests of the child clearly
played a significant role in his decision.
Two different approaches were taken by the High Court
and the Constitutional Court in relation to Grootboom.
The differences, in part, focused upon the nature of
housing and shelter.
The Constitutional Court rejected the High Court’s
distinction between shelter and housing. The judgment of
the High Court interpreted section 28(1)(c) as obliging the
state to provide rudimentary shelter to children and their
parents “on demand if parents are unable to shelter their
children”, and such a duty is “irrespective of the availability
of resources.” This obligation is in addition to the section
26 duty to take reasonable legislative and other measures.
According to the Constitutional Court the High Court’s
reasoning produced…“An anomalous result: People who
have children have a direct and enforceable right to
housing under section 28(1)(c) while others who have
none or whose children are adult are not entitled to
housing under that section, no matter how old, disabled or
otherwise deserving they may be. The carefully
constructed constitutional scheme would make little sense
if it could be trumped in ever case by the rights of children
to get shelter from the state on demand.”
The Constitutional Court thought this created the risk of
children being exploited “as stepping stones to housing for
their parents.”
Housing and shelter are “related concepts” – the goal of
housing is to provide “physical shelter”. Under paragraph
73, housing can be distinguished from home which
according to the European Commission on Human Rights
is concerned with an existing structure and does not imply
the right to be provided with housing accommodation (see
Applications No 5727/72, 5744/72 and 5857/72). The
clear lack of a qualifier before shelter implies that it is not
restricted to basic shelter. “The concept of shelter in
section 28(1)(c) embraces shelter in all its manifestations.”
Both the approach of the Commission on Human
Settlements and the Global Strategy for Shelter to the year
2000 appear to support this relatedness, providing a
definition which is very close to adequate housing:
“Adequate shelter means.adequate privacy, adequate space, 29





adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation,
adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with
regard to work and basic facilities – all at a reasonable cost.”
This, however, begs the question, why did the drafters of
the Constitution choose to use different terminologies in
the two sections, particularly since Yacoob J “cannot accept
that the Constitution draws any real distinction’ between
housing and shelter?” (para 73). This leads to one of three
conclusions: either the Constitution at the very least
unhelpfully muddies the waters by using two different
words for two similar concepts; or the Constitution is
flawed, using two different words when it only intended
only one concept; or the notion of shelter enshrines an
additional entitlement for children and therefore for any
family members on whom the child is dependant.
The problem is, what is the additional entitlement?
Davis J avoided the trap and did not equate shelter with
child institutions in which adult family members do not
remain. He defined shelter as the “right to be protected
from the elements in circumstances where there is no need
to remove such children from their parents.” It must also
mean something other than institutionalisation, as under
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international laws institutionalisation is the last resort.
This left the Constitutional Court with a quandary. A
constitution which it had certified only five years previously
contains a result, which it found unacceptable. The
Constitutional Court impressively and deftly performed
gold-medal-winning legal gymnastics. If anyone blinks,
even for a moment, they miss the shifting of weight (see
further Van Bueren, “No Turning Back, The Right to
Housing is Justiciable in Cheadle, Davis and Haysom”, South
African Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights 2002).
Protection
Children’s rights can be divided into the four Ps –
prevention, provision, protection and participation (see
further Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the
Child, Kluwer, l998, at 15). The Treatment Action
Campaign and Grootboom focus on issues of prevention
and provision– the prevention of HIV/AIDS and the
provision of housing and basic shelter. The Canadian case
of Sharpe (R v Sharpe, Judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada, January 26 2001) raises issues surrounding the
third P – protection.
John Sharpe was charged with two counts of possession
of child pornography for the purpose of distribution or
sale, as well as two counts of simple possession for his own
private use. As part of the evidence was a collection of 17
stories written by Sharpe. It was accepted at the trial that
the stories were extremely violent, the majority of them,
with sexual acts involving very young children and in most
cases concerned children under the age of 10 engaged in
sadomasochistic and violent sex acts. The theme is often
that the child enjoys the beatings and the sexual violence,
and that children are actually seeking out such treatment.
Conveniently absolving John Sharpe of any moral
responsibility.
Prior to the beginning of his trial in the Supreme Court
of British Columbia, Sharpe challenged the
constitutionality of a number of provisions of the Criminal
Code including, that mere possession of child pornography
infringed his right to “freedom of thought, belief, opinion
and expression”. The majority of the Canadian Supreme
Court, agreeing with Sharpe’s counsel that the restriction
on simple possession of child pornography was
disproportionate. The majority of the Court held that…
“The cost of prohibiting such materials to the right of free
expression, outweighs any tenuous benefit it might confer
in preventing harm to children.”
The use of the word tenuous is significant. The
distinction between the private and the public has always
been used to the detriment of children enjoying
constitutional rights and with sexual abuse and sexual
exploitation, it is precisely in the private, where much of
the abuse is perpetrated. Sharpe does nothing to combat
such abuses.
In an impassioned minority judgment written by
L’Heureux-Dubé the judges found that the constitutional
protection of any form of expression which risks
undermining Canada’s society’s fundamental values must
be carefully scrutinized. The minority found that the very
existence of child pornography is inherently harmful to
children and to society. According to the minority this
harm is independent of any dissemination or any risk of
dissemination, and flows directly from the existence of the
pornographic representations, which on their own violate
the dignity and equality rights of children.
The minority did concede that the attitudinal harm
inherent in child pornography is not empirically
measurable, nor susceptible to proof in the traditional
manner (see Thomson Newspapers, supra, at para 92, and
R v Mara, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 630), but argued that the harm
of child pornography is inherent, because it is degrading,
dehumanising, and objectifying depictions of children,
which by their very existence, undermine the Charter
rights of children and other members of society. Child
pornography, the minority argued, eroticises the inferior
social, economic, and sexual status of children. It preys on
pre-existing inequalities.
The minority judgment also questioned, whether in the
computer age a clear distinction can be drawn between
mere possession and possession with intent to distribute.
This was a point which did not appear to weigh heavily
with the Chief Justice and the majority, even though some
of Sharpe’s material was on computer disk and capable of
instantaneous distribution.
The Sharpe case illustrates the obstacles in protecting
children’s rights in constitutions which have no child30
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specific provisions The Canadian Charter of Rights
expresses the right to freedom of expression and thought
but does not contain any express rights on children,
outside of children’s linguistic educational rights. The
Canadian Supreme Court interprets legislation on the basis
that the legislature is presumed to respect the values and
principles enshrined in international law, both customary
and conventional. These constitute a part of the legal
context, in which legislation is enacted and, so far as
possible, interpretations which reflect international values
and principles are preferred (Slaight Communications, supra,
at pp 1056–57). Where there is a balancing of competing
interests, as there was in the Sharpe case, the balance must
be informed by Canada’s international obligations. The
implication is that the prohibition of child sexual
exploitation and the principle of best interests of the child,
both enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child to which Canada is a party, ought to have been
weighed in the balance.
The Sharpe case is even more extraordinary because of its
timing. The judgment was delivered at the beginning of
2001, at a time when the Canadian government was
preparing for a United Nations Congress on Child Sexual
Exploitation, preparing its report on how Canada has
abided by its international legal obligation to eradicate
child pornography. As the minority of judges in Sharpe
observed, the Canadian Charter ought not to be used to
reverse advances made by vulnerable groups or to defeat
measures intended to protect the disadvantaged and
comparatively powerless members of society (On this
point, it is helpful to refer to R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, Dickson CJ at p 779). Yet this is
precisely what happened in Sharpe.
Participation
The fourth P is participation, which is seen as the most
radical of the 4 P’s and for which there still needs to be
much progress, particularly in relation to children
participating as a group. Like South Africa, Hungary and
Estonia, although for very different reasons, are states in
transition. In Hungary, the Act of Association requires a
judge to refuse registration of an association if the
objectives of the association violates the rights and
freedoms of others. The statute of a gay rights association
allowed for the membership of children under the age of l8
and registration was refused. The question before the
Constitutional Court of Hungary was whether there had
been a violation of any constitutional rights and the
Constitutional Court of Hungary replied in the negative
(Judgment 21/1996 in Magyar Kozlony 39/96 – the English
summary is at www. Codices.coe.int at HUN-l996-2-005).
The Hungarian Constitutional Court stated that it
regarded homosexuality as having a controversial standing
in Hungarian society. The Constitutional Court regarded
membership of the association as akin to taking up a public
position on sexuality, which the Constitutional Court
believed could be decisive for the child’s moral and
physical development in later life. The Hungarian
Constitutional Court did not say that being gay would
endanger the moral development of children, as this would
have been open discrimination rather the Court, argued
that because of a child’ s age, a child may not be sufficiently
mature to take such a mature decision (I am grateful to
Stephanie Megies for this case).
Yet the concept that children who may not yet have
chosen their own sexuality being forced into a homosexual
relationship, is one of the classic prejudices against gay
men and women. According to the Court being gay was a
decisive decision, because of the negative images of gay
men and women in Hungarian society. The Court seemed
to be unaware that its own ruling would add to the social
stigmatisation felt by young gay people.
The Constitutional court did concede that being a
member of a gay association would be very helpful for a gay
child, but the Court said that membership in a gay
association would constitute a public commitment that
would preclude children from choosing a different
sexuality later on in life. Although the Court sought to
emphasise that its decision was not in any way influenced
by a moral judgment on homosexuality, the Court appeared
singularly unaware of the impact its own subjective belief
had on a judgment concerning child sexuality.
The Court could have adopted a very different
approach, arguing for the need for a more accepting,
diverse society in Hungary but instead it fell back on an age
old myth, that older children are unable to make informed
decisions about their own sexuality. The duty of the state to
protect children was misinterpreted by the Court, as it
often has been in history, to limit the right of children to
freedom of association. A more positive position on the
child’s constitutional right to freedom of association has
been taken by the Constitutional Court of Estonia. The
President had referred a statute, The Non-Profit
Associations Act, to the Constitutional Court, as it raised
issues in relation to article 48(1) of the Estonian
Constitution, which provides that: “Everyone has the right
to form non-profit associations.”
The Estonian Non-Profit Associations Act prohibited all
those under l8 from establishing non-profit associations.
The President argued that the words “everyone in the
Estonian constitution” meant just that, and that Estonia, as
a party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, was bound to implement the child’s right to
freedom of association enshrined in article 15 of the
Convention. The Constitutional Court accepted these
arguments and declared the Non- Profits Associations Act
unconstitutional. This paves the way for child unions and
indeed for children’s membership of political organisations
(Riigi teataj I 35 Article 737. English summary at
www.Codices.coe.int EST-1996-2-2001). 31






Children’s rights are capable of proper protection under
national constitutions, but this still leaves the question of
whether they can effect how a state regulates relationships
between individuals. In essence, horizontality concerns
trickle down. How far are the constitutional rights of child
citizens protected in their private as distinct from their
public relationships? The issue is a particularly critical one
for children. Many children spend significant parts of their
lives in the private sphere and conduct relationships with
private individuals as distinct from public officials.
Constitutional courts which only protected the public
sphere would offer few effective remedies for most of the
constitutional violations endured by children.
The Slovakian Constitutional Court considered the case
of a 14-year-old girl who had been assaulted on a number
of occasions by two boys in her neighbourhood. On at least
two occasions her injuries were such that she required
medical attention. The girl’s mother applied to the district
government which had a legal duty to protect children’s
welfare and the district government met with the father of
the two boys to discuss the boys’ behaviour but took no
further action.
The mother, on behalf of her daughter, argued before
the Constitutional Court of Slovakia that her right to
privacy and family life, as guaranteed under article l9(2) of
the Slovakian Constitution had been breached and further
she argued that two articles of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, article 3(2) and article l6, had been
violated due to insufficient protection by the district
government (Zbierka nalezov a uzneseni Ustavneho sud
Slovenkskejn reubliky, English summary at
www.codices.coe.int at SVK-1997-3-008). Article 16 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits
unlawful interference with privacy and family life, and
article 3(2) of the Convention obliges the government take
all appropriate legislative and administrative measures to
ensure the well being of the child (see further Van Bueren,
The International Law on the Rights of the Child).
The Constitutional Court ruled that merely because the
case concerned a child did not mean that children ought to
have a lower expectation of enjoyment and protection of
their constitutional rights. The Court held that the
constitutional guarantee of rights also bound the state to
protect constitutional rights in relationships between
private individuals, this the Court ruled was a positive duty
placed on the state by the Constitution. The Constitutional
Court ruled that the district government did not perform
its obligation to take all administrative measures, as laid
down by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and
that the constitutional right of the child to privacy and
family life had been violated. The Slovakian judgment is a
case with much potential as it would also, by implication,
place children’s protection from domestic abuse firmly
within the core of constitutional protection. It is a
constructive intertwining of international and
constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
The cases demonstrate that it is more difficult to develop
a culture of child-centred jurisprudence under
constitutions which omit child specific provisions. General
constitutions which apply only to everyone, without
incorporating specific child-centred rights, run the risk of
creating a low priority and even invisibility of children as
has happened with treaties such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This has
implications for the United Kingdom. The UK has
incorporated a part of the European Convention on
Human Rights into the Human Rights Act, but the
Convention lacks an article similar to section 28 of the
South African constitution protecting children’s rights.
The Sharpe case also shows us, that where states such as
Canada have to weigh competing rights in the balance, the
heavier weight is more likely to be accorded to the
expressly enshrined constitutional rights. It has to be asked
whether a different weight would have been given by the
majority of the Supreme Court if the Canadian Charter
protected children expressly from sexual exploitation, or
expressly provided for the guiding principle of the best
interests of the child? For lawyers it is far easier to argue
under a comprehensive constitution then have to bring in,
almost as a secondary argument, points of international law.
It is precisely where serious consideration is able to be
given by the judiciary to the international right of the child
that there is a corresponding improvement in the
constitutional rights of children. It is no coincidence that
the unacceptable levels of child poverty in industrialised
states has happened in countries such as the United
Kingdom, Canada and the United States where children do
not have specific constitutional rights and where children
are also disenfranchised. This lack of effective means of
legal challenge simply means that governments are free to
pass legislation, which draws from the children’s share of
national resources. The growing corpus of constitutional
jurisprudence on children’s rights demonstrates that not
only are constitutions an appropriate practical vehicle for
protecting the fundamental rights of all children, but they
are also essential.
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